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 This Article argues that we ought to examine this country’s early AIDS crisis for lessons 
on addressing HIV as well as to improve the ongoing social movement of sexual minorities in the 
United States.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, AIDS influenced sexual minorities’ advocacy 
efforts as both liberationists working to deregulate sexuality and integrationists seeking access 
to heterosexual privilege recognized that their agendas needed to acknowledge this new crisis.  
Over time, a liberationist response to AIDS emerged and dominated the social movement 
because sexual minorities had to publicly defend their differences in order to stay alive.  
Decades later, without the horrific, unifying force of the early AIDS crisis, elites at the helm of 
the social movement have taken an integrationist turn.  Movement elites now favor integrationist 
objectives like marriage, neglecting the pressing needs of their marginalized movement 
counterparts.  By honoring key lessons from the early AIDS crisis and using the momentum of 
the modern integrationist movement to advance more liberationist goals, sexual minorities have 
the power to propel society toward greater justice for all. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Social movements are indispensable to law’s development.  They help conceptualize 
legislative initiatives and guide judicial interpretation of new statutes.1  In the context of the 
                                                
* Ryan H. Easley Research Fellow, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  Thank you to the 
journal for its incredible work as well as to Sanjay De, Sue McCarty, and Danielle Keats Citron. 
1 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements and Public law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
419, 419 (2001) (“Social movements generated many important statutes we now take for granted, such as the 
environmental and civil rights laws.  The dynamics of statutory evolution are strongly influenced by those 
movements and their internal dynamics.”).  See generally Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 
EMORY L.J. 663, 666–69 (2012) (describing scholarship on cause lawyering that examines the relationship between 
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Fourteenth Amendment, social movements have defined our Constitution.2  Identity-based social 
movements have had an especially salient impact on modern American law, which has 
marginalized women and minorities and thus given them powerful reasons to unify behind 
aspirations for shared social, political, and legal advancements.3  Particularly in the past three 
decades, legal actors and others seeking to subjugate sexual minorities4 have triggered mass 
mobilization as traumatic subordination has served as a clarion call for collective activism.5 
To be sure, oppressive laws have never guaranteed a social movement.6  Progress for 
minorities frequently comes at a high cost, with repercussions including unemployment, life-
threatening violence, and criminal penalties.7  Various factors have facilitated the mobilization of 
sexual minorities, such as the effect of urbanization to concentrate non-heterosexual-identified 
individuals in large cities8 and the increased accessibility of ideas and records of shared 
experience that unite sexual minorities while discrediting homophobia.9  Moreover, Professor 
                                                                                                                                                       
litigation and intragroup difference, sociolegal work on legal mobilization within social movements, and social 
movement theory analyzing how movements materialize, operate, persuade, and survive). 
2 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 419 (“Social movements have been one engine driving constitutional evolution as 
well.  The modern meaning of the Equal Protection Clause owes much more to the power and norms of the civil 
rights and women’s liberation movements than to the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers.”). 
3 See id. at 423–25 (explaining that advocates for sexual minorities were among the most important social 
movements of the second half of the twentieth century and that “[l]aw and legal discourse played an unusually 
important rule in the formation of these [identity-based social movements]” by helping to “define a class of people 
whose social identity was dominated by a legally stigmatizing trait” and imposing costs giving “various groups 
stronger reasons to band together and to transform social attitudes”). 
4 This Article uses the term “sexual minority” to denote individuals who do not identify with widespread notions of 
heterosexuality.  Heterosexuality is used in its contemporary meaning of an exclusive, intimate relationship between 
a biologically and socially identified man and woman, although the term was first used to label “mental 
hermaphrodites” and the so-called mental disorder of being attracted to both men and women.  See James G. 
Kiernan, Responsibility in Sexual Perversion, 3 CHI. MED. REC. 185, 199 n.30 (1892).  This Article generally avoids 
the language of gay and straight, including the popular abbreviation “LGBT,” because sexuality and sexual identity 
exist on continua.  See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638 (1948). 
5 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 426 (discussing advocates for sexual minorities and other identity-based social 
movements and observing that “legal actors hostile to minorities gave minority agenda entrepreneurs the crises or 
dramatic events they needed to trigger mass mobilization against stigmatizing policies and attitudes” and that the 
mass mobilization of such movements “was not easily possible without the state as both adversary (state enforcers) 
and ally (legislature sometimes, the judiciary more often)”). 
6 See id. at 432–33 (asserting that legal exclusions and stigmas helped trigger identity-based social movements but 
“did not assure that minority people would form a social movement, for law could also raise the costs of objecting to 
stigmatic exclusions”). 
7 See id. at 438 (explaining that the cost imposed by legal and societal trait-based shaming and discrimination 
“provides a reason for marginalized people to engage in activism to change the norm” but “[t]he cost of a stigma, 
however, does not provide a sufficient reason for this activism” when the price of participation, such as “social 
ostracism, loss of employment, state harassment, and sometimes imprisonment or lynching,” is greater than the 
benefits).  Moreover, sexual minorities that believe they deserve their subjugation may lack the sense of self-worth 
to struggle for change.  See id. at 439 (“A social group defined and penalized by legal stigmas will not have an 
incentive to organize so long as most of its members view their stigma as justified, acceptable, or inevitable.”). 
8 See generally Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REV. 955, 957 (2012) 
(“Cities have been the engine of legal developments and innovations concerning sexual orientation since the advent 
of the gay rights struggle during the 1970s, and they are still at the forefront of the most contentious issues 
pertaining to gays and lesbians.”). 
9 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 441–42 (describing policies that “fueled this aborning solidarity with information 
and ideas that undermined the foundations of stigmatizing discrimination” and underscoring urbanization, literature 
that helped sexual minorities learn that others felt as they did, and access to scientific papers rejecting non-
heterosexual status as a mental abnormality).  
2013] LESSONS FROM A PLAGUE  294 
 
 
William Eskridge has described “mobilization moments, where representatives of the old status 
regime took a firm position against identity-based protesters insisting on a new normative 
regime—but with disastrous consequences for the old regime.”10 
The archetypal mobilization moment for sexual minorities was Stonewall.11  On June 27, 
1969, police engaged in a then-routine method of harassing sexual minorities by raiding the 
Stonewall Inn, a popular recreational spot in New York’s City’s Greenwich Village.12  A few 
customers fought back, which was remarkable at the time, leading to nights of demonstrations 
and riots with thousands gathering in Greenwich Village.13  The Village Voice extensively 
covered the events that, Eskridge explained, “[l]iterally overnight, . . . transformed a homophile 
movement of several hundred earnest homosexuals into a gay liberation movement populated by 
tens of thousands . . . who formed hundreds of new organizations demanding radical changes in 
the way gay people are treated by the state.”14  Recognizing this mobilization moment’s 
significance, President Barack Obama described the Stonewall protesters in his 2013 Inaugural 
Address as “forebears” guided by the star “that all of us are created equal.”15 
A recent exchange between Judge Richard Posner and writer Andrew Sullivan implicated 
another series of mobilization moments that this article will examine in serious detail: the early 
AIDS crisis.16  In May 2012, inspired by President Obama’s declaration of support for marriage 
equality, Judge Posner blogged various reasons why same-sex marriage “no longer seem[ed] a 
hot issue.”17  According to Judge Posner, “[i]n the 1950s, when I was growing up, homosexuals 
had, as homosexuals, no rights,” but, “[b]eginning in the 1960s and accelerating dramatically in 
the 1990s and 2000s, legal changes and changes in public attitudes resulted in the dismantling of 
most public and private discriminatory measures against homosexuals.”18   
While Judge Posner found “something of a puzzle” in why “resistance seemed to melt 
away rather than having to be overcome by militant action,” he asserted that with more tolerance 
for non-marital sex and cohabitation, as well as “the decline of prudery,” heterosexuals 
experienced less revulsion over “deviant sexual practices.”19  Similarly, as sexual minorities 
became more visible to heterosexuals, “the latter discovered that homosexuals are for the most 
part indistinguishable from heterosexuals, and this created sympathy for homosexuals’ desire to 
be treated equally with heterosexuals both generally and in regard to marriage.”20  Most 
                                                
10 Id. at 458. 
11 Id. at 456–57. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 457. 
14 Id. 
15 Press Release, President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama (Jan. 21, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama. 
16 When discussing the policy and legal implications of the AIDS crisis, this Article employs HIV and AIDS 
interchangeably.  However, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is the causative agent of acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS).  Basic Information About HIV and AIDS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).  HIV is commonly 
transmitted through human blood, breast milk, and sexual fluids, and it attacks the body’s CD4+ T Cells, which help 
fight diseases.  Id.  AIDS develops if HIV has severely damaged an individual’s immune system.  Id. 
17 Judge Richard Posner, Homosexual Marriage—Posner, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (May 13, 2012, 4:33 PM), 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/05/homosexual-marriageposner.html. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  For a brief account of the impact of modern changes in popular attitudes toward sexual minorities 
acknowledging the oppressive dimensions of assimilation into heterosexuality, see KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE 
HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 19 (2006). 
 295 WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW [VOL. 4:292 
 
important to Judge Posner was the gradual realization by heterosexuals that sexual orientation 
was not a choice or caused by seduction or recruitment.21  After noting the failure of prevention 
efforts to “cure” non-heterosexuals and Republican leaders’ “tacit acknowledgment that 
homosexual marriage, and homosexuals rights in general, have no economic significance,” Judge 
Posner concluded, “[i]t seems that the only remaining basis for opposition to homosexual 
marriage, or to legal equality between homosexuals and heterosexuals in general, is religious.”22 
Responding to Judge Posner’s attempt to explain the “sea change in gay rights,” gay-
identified Sullivan argued that Posner made a crucial omission when he failed to consider the 
early AIDS crisis.23  For Sullivan, our collective consciousness shifted as a consequence of, in a 
decade’s time, losing more than 300,000 young people to AIDS.24  Sullivan explained that 
“polling on gay rights has seen an accelerating transformation” in comparison to relatively stable 
public sentiment on other issues like abortion because, as a consequence of AIDS, “[p]eople 
discovered[ed] gay people in their own families and among their friends and co-workers,” 
causing their attitudes to “shift very suddenly.”25 
Taking cues from Sullivan and Posner’s disagreement, this Article leverages the AIDS 
pandemic and its activists to examine the bidirectional relationship between HIV and sexual 
minorities.  This Article seeks to deconstruct “the puzzle” of advancing rights for sexual 
minorities but rejects Posner’s notion that “resistance seemed to melt away rather than having to 
be overcome by militant action.”26  Like Stonewall, AIDS fostered a series of conflicts in which 
an old status regime took disastrous positions against identity-based protesters insisting on a new 
normative regime.  Ongoing contemplation of the mobilization moments of the AIDS crisis in 
                                                                                                                                                       
Just as I had moved through . . . demands for assimilation as an individual, the gay community had 
done so as a group.  Through the middle of the twentieth century, gays were routinely asked to 
convert to heterosexuality, whether through lobotomies, electroshock therapy, or psychoanalysis.  
As the gay rights movement gained strength, the demand to convert gradually ceded to the demand 
to pass.  This shift can be seen in the military’s adoption in 1993 of the “Don’t ask, don’t tell” 
policy, under which gays are permitted to serve so long as we agree to pass.  Finally, at 
millennium’s turn, the demand to pass is giving way to the demand to cover—gays are 
increasingly permitted to be gay and out so long as we do not “flaunt” our identities.  The 
contemporary resistance to gay marriage can be understood as a covering demand: Fine, be gay, 
but don’t shove it in our faces. 
Id. 
21 Posner, supra note 17.  Judge Posner elaborated on explanations why “a combination of genetic factors . . . and 
prenatal and other biological factors cause homosexuality” after remarking “[t]hat there is a genetic component in 
homosexuality may seem paradoxical, since homosexuals produce on average fewer offspring than heterosexuals, 
which might lead one to expect that over time homosexuality would diminish and eventually disappear—which of 
course has not happened.”  Id.  These explanations included that “in the harsh ancestral environment in which 
human beings evolved, there was a tradeoff between number and survival of offspring,” and “[b]oth menopause and 
homosexuality are ways of increasing the ratio of adult caregivers to children, since homosexuals can provide care 
to their nephews and nieces and menopausal women to their grandchildren, without either group having obligations 
to their own children.”  Id.  An alternative theory that Judge Posner articulated, “for which there is some evidence, is 
that male homosexuality has survived because the female relatives of male homosexuals are more fertile than 
women who have no male homosexual relatives.”  Id. 
22 Id.  Judge Posner then cautioned that, as a non-theocracy, the United States “should hesitate to enact laws that 
serve religious rather than pragmatic secular aims, such as material welfare and national security.”  Id. 
23 Andrew Sullivan, How Have Gays Won?, THE DISH (May 14, 2012, 4:41 PM), 
http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2012/05/14/how-have-gays-won/. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Posner, supra note 17. 
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the United States serves both contemporary endeavors to address HIV and the identity-based 
social movement of sexual minorities.  AIDS reset the movement’s agenda, forcing sexual 
minorities to publicly defend their differences to stay alive.  After years of advocacy, HIV 
remains an ongoing tragedy in the United States, and remedying injustices such as those 
experienced by all varieties of sexual minorities continues to be vital. 
Part I analyzes how notions of identity have shaped the U.S. response to HIV by 
summarizing the country’s statistical and social vision of HIV and contextualizing these 
perceptions as the foundation of the federal response.  This Article then contrasts the moralizing 
impulses that have influenced the American reaction to HIV with the promise of the Obama 
Administration and the National HIV/AIDS Strategy,27 which meets stigma28 and the challenge 
of AIDS-related identity politics head-on.  HIV and AIDS are far from eradicated, and an 
effective response continues to depend on addressing inequality across various aspects of policy 
and the law. 
In evaluating how the AIDS crisis has guided the contemporary trajectory of American 
sexual minority rights, Part II reconciles attitudes toward sexual minorities and the stigmatization 
of individuals living with HIV.  The more mainstream HIV became, the weaker the stigma 
associated with the virus, but without the same urgency to rally against the AIDS crisis, sexual 
minorities have become more internally divided.  In the absence of the earlier American 
epidemic’s horrific, unifying force, the most elite set the movement’s advocacy agenda while 
less politically empowered sexual minorities continue to live and die in silence.  An 
integrationist approach, such as one that strives to garner sympathy for the movement through 
the claim “that homosexuals are for the most part indistinguishable from heterosexuals,”29 
discounts valuable lessons from the AIDS crisis and disguises homogenization as social justice.30  
A renewed focus on liberation—encompassing efforts to deregulate gender and sexuality while 
safeguarding individual autonomy—is necessary if social, political, and legal advancements are 
to fully reflect the shared struggles of sexual minorities in today’s United States.  The 
movement’s agenda must refocus on the differences it so powerfully defended during the earlier 
years of AIDS and reapply its powerful integrationist mechanisms to the causes of a more 
diverse array of movement constituents. 
                                                
27 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POLICY, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
(2010), available at http://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/NHAS.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L HIV/AIDS 
STRATEGY FOR THE U.S.].  The White House released an implementation plan alongside the National HIV/AIDS 
Strategy, and this Article will discuss both documents interchangeably.  For the implementation plan, see THE 
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NAT’L AIDS POLICY, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
(2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/nhas-implementation.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L 
HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]. 
28 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 1 (1963). 
The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to refer to 
bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier.  
The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or 
a traitor—a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places.  Later, 
in Christian times, two layers of metaphor were added to the term: the first referred to bodily signs 
of holy grace that took the form of eruptive blossoms on the skin; the second, a medical allusion to 
this religious allusion, referred to bodily signs of physical disorder. 
Id. 
29 Posner, supra note 17. 
30 Cf. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 114 (1999) 
(arguing that the privilege to marry for sexual minorities invigorates the normalizing power of marriage while 
stigmatizing the unmarried and promoting heteronormativity). 
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II. AIDS IN THE KINGDOM OF THE WELL 
Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship.  Everyone who is born 
holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick.  
Although we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of us is 
obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place.31 
 
Ronald Reagan set a low bar for American presidents when he commented publicly on 
HIV for the first time nearly six years after the initial known cases of the virus.32  By the mid-
1980s, researchers had already published strong evidence that HIV could not be transmitted 
through the air or casual contact.33  Despite what the federal government already knew about 
HIV, President Reagan made his first public remarks on the subject in August 1985, just as 
parents’ fear for children becoming infected through casual contact hit a frenzy.34  When asked 
whether children with AIDS should be allowed to attend public schools, President Reagan 
responded: “I’m glad I’m not faced with that problem.”35 
President Reagan’s statement was an early manifestation of the United States’ national 
alienation of individuals living with HIV.  At a time when HIV-diagnosed people of all ages 
experienced constant harassment and social isolation,36 President Reagan chose to cast children 
living with HIV as “that problem” rather than harness his platform to disseminate evidence-
based information about HIV transmission.37  Consequently, President Reagan elevated HIV-
uninfected Americans above those living with HIV and struggling for survival in the face of 
ineffective treatment options38 and widespread social condemnation.39 
Subsequently, the architects of American AIDS policy designed the country’s response to 
a global health crisis around their discomfort.  The AIDS pandemic materialized in the wake of 
                                                
31 SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 3 (2001). 
32 See Alex Wodak, The US War on Harm Reduction: Fixing Policy on Intelligence and Facts, 2 HARM REDUCTION 
J. 14 (2005), http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/pdf/1477-7517-2-14.pdf (expressing dissatisfaction that 
little changed with the three presidents that followed Ronald Reagan, who avoided public comment on HIV for the 
first six years of the epidemic).  
33 See Gilbert A. Partida, AIDS: Do Children with AIDS Have a Right to Attend School?, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 1041, 
1042 (1985) (concluding that research had strongly indicated that HIV cannot be transmitted through casual contact 
and that transmission is not airborne). 
34 See id. at 1047 (explaining that the debate over whether children living with AIDS should attend public schools 
raged and “it is the parents of healthy school children whom the fear of AIDS has hit the hardest”). 
35 See id. at 1045 (recollecting President Reagan’s first public comment on HIV). 
36 See Anne Malcolm et al., HIV-related Stigmatization and Discrimination: Its Forms and Contexts, 8 CRITICAL 
PUB. HEALTH 347, 356 (1998) (“The harassment and scapegoating of people with AIDS and those who are 
suspected of being infected or belonging to a specific group has been widely reported since the beginning of the 
epidemic.”). 
37 This Article does not argue that AIDS represents a crisis without scientific uncertainty, but factual ambiguity is 
not an adequate justification for irresponsible rhetoric.  See PAULA A. TREICHLER, HOW TO HAVE THEORY IN AN 
EPIDEMIC: CULTURAL CHRONICLES OF AIDS 16 (1999) (explaining that regardless of whether a scientist has learned 
to properly converse with the media, “ambiguity and uncertainty are features of scientific inquiry to be socially and 
linguistically managed”). 
38 See Anthony S. Fauci, The AIDS Epidemic: Considerations for the 21st Century, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1046, 
1047–48 (1999) (observing that AIDS-related mortality did not see a drastic decline until the mid-1990s when 
improved prophylaxes against opportunistic infections and potent treatment became available). 
39 See Malcolm et al., supra note 36, at 349 (arguing that discrimination against individuals living with HIV has 
taken a variety of forms and that the emergence of HIV amplified the preexisting stigmatization of certain groups of 
people, including sexual minorities, sex workers, drug users, migrants, and non-whites). 
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the abstinence-only sex education movement,40 and key government bodies responded by 
confining the individuals most affected by HIV within socially destructive caricatures.41  The 
public morality that accompanied HIV in the 1980s and 1990s shaped various aspects of AIDS 
policy,42 including groundbreaking legislation like the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS 
Resources Emergency (“CARE”) Act.43   
In the twenty-first century, newly empowered social conservatives in the United States 
authored the international HIV policy agenda and fostered a religiously motivated, scientifically 
flawed approach to prevention.44  Throughout the growth of the pandemic, individuals living 
with and at highest risk for HIV have been frequently distrustful of health care institutions for 
historical, representational, and other reasons, detracting from what relief efforts might have 
accomplished had more people with HIV sought care.45  HIV continues to thrive among 
politically disempowered populations,46 and the United States’ approach to ending AIDS is 
simply inadequate.47 
A. WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ABOUT PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV 
Although surveillance has provided an imperfect understanding of HIV,48 
epidemiological profiles can promote understanding of the rationale behind the government’s 
                                                
40 See Naomi Rivkind Shatz, Unconstitutional Entanglements: The Religious Right, the Federal Government, and 
Abstinence Education in the Schools, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 495, 510 (2008) (observing that the abstinence-only 
sexuality education movement emerged in the 1970s and 1980s alongside the New Right and grew from anti-
abortion, anti-sexual minority, and anti-sexuality education and religious groups). 
41 See Brooke G. Schoepf, AIDS, History, and Struggles over Meaning, in HIV AND AIDS IN AFRICA: BEYOND 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 15, 16 (Ezekiel Kalipeni et al. eds., 2004) (explaining that governments reacted to HIV by restricting 
individuals living with HIV within “boundaries of stigma”). 
42 See Sara Klemm, Keeping Prevention in the Crosshairs: A Better HIV Exposure Law for Maryland, 13 J. HEALTH 
CARE L. & POL’Y 495, 497–98 (2010) (noting that state statutes that criminalize HIV transmission first emerged 
from federal requirements in the Ryan White CARE Act and reflect the general public morality surrounding the HIV 
pandemic).  
43 Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990).  
Ryan White programs were last extended under the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-87, 123 Stat. 2885 (2009); see infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.  See generally Steven R. 
Keener, A Comparative Analysis of the Origins and Structure of Public Health Financing for HIV Care in the 
United States and England, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1357, 1369-1375 (2008) (explaining how holes in Medicare 
and Medicaid coverage prompted Congress to pass the Ryan White CARE Act and that the combination of these 
three government programs usually means individuals who are aware of their status have access to quality care, but 
not without continuing barriers to healthy outcomes). 
44 See Holly Burkhalter, The Politics of AIDS: Engaging Conservative Activists, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 8, 8-10, 12-14 
(2004) (describing the role of evangelicals in rallying political support for international AIDS initiatives and 
recounting their flawed approach to HIV prevention). 
45 See, e.g., Sheryl Thorburn Bird & Laura M. Bogart, Conspiracy Beliefs About HIV/AIDS and Birth Control 
Among African Americans: Implications for the Prevention of HIV, Other STIs, and Unintended Pregnancy, 61 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 109 (2005) (acknowledging many black Americans’ historically well-founded mistrust of medical 
institutions and concluding that HIV prevention, treatment, and education efforts must acknowledge widely 
disseminated conspiracy theories that blame the proliferation and continuation of HIV on the U.S. government). 
46 See Wafaa M. El-Sadr et al., AIDS in America – Forgotten but Not Gone, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 967, 968 (2010) 
(explaining that HIV remains common “among the disenfranchised and socially marginalized”). 
47 See Chris Collins & Dazon Dixon Diallo, A Prevention Response That Fits America’s Epidemic: Community 
Perspectives on the Status of HIV Prevention in the United States, 55 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 
S148, S148 (2010) (arguing that HIV prevention in the United States “is not designed to address this kind of 
epidemic”). 
48 See John M. Karon et al., HIV in the United States at the Turn of the Century: An Epidemic in Transition, 91 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1060, 1061 (2001) (“HIV incidence cannot be measured directly in the population, because many 
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reaction to the AIDS crisis.49  Analysis of statistical information about the incidence, prevalence, 
and demographic impact of HIV; trends in attitudes toward people living with the virus; and the 
federal government’s earlier responses—the Ryan White CARE Act in particular—reveal the 
role of identity politics in the country’s AIDS epidemic.50  These politics create a point of 
contrast for recent improvements to federal AIDS policy as well as this Article’s 
recommendations about how to continue to advance care and prevention efforts.51 
 1. PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND HIV STIGMA 
 The United States has experienced new HIV infections at a rapid rate.  The country 
reported more than half the world’s 70,000 AIDS cases between 1981 and 1988.52  Later, the 
nation’s epidemiologists calculated the incidence somewhere between 40,000 and 80,000 new 
infections each year from 1987 to 1992.53  Researchers considered the rate of new infections 
generally constant through the 1990s in the absence of national surveys that could provide 
incidence estimates among specific groups or the general population.54  In 2008, breakthroughs 
in surveillance technology improved epidemiologists’ understanding of HIV incidence in the 
United States,55 exposing longstanding errors in past estimates that had placed annual incidence 
closer to 40,000.56  New estimates showed that the country’s incidence had in fact increased at 
the end of the 1990s57 to around 56,000 new adolescent and adult infections each year.58  In 
December 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated annual HIV incidence 
at around 50,000 new cases.59 
The immense number of both diagnosed and undiagnosed individuals living with HIV in 
the United States has long been cause for alarm.  HIV prevalence is not directly observable 
                                                                                                                                                       
newly infected persons do not seek or are not offered an HIV test and there is no easily measured biomarker for 
recent infection.”). 
49 See id. at 1066 (claiming that surveillance data has been employed “to allocate federal resources for prevention 
and treatment”). 
50 See infra Part II.A.1. 
51 See infra Part II.A. 2. 
52 See James W. Curran et al., Epidemiology of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States, 239 SCIENCE 610, 610 
(1988) (explaining that in the seven years since 1981, 127 countries had reported more than 70,000 cases and “well 
over half have been reported from the United States”). 
53 Philip S. Rosenberg, Scope of the AIDS Epidemic in the United States, 270 SCIENCE 1372, 1374 (1995). 
54 See Karon et al., supra note 48, at 1064 (noting that in the absence of national surveys providing HIV incidence, 
researchers approximated a relatively constant HIV incidence throughout the 1990s based on a summary of 
estimates made in studies about persons with behavioral risks in select sample populations). 
55 Formal estimates for HIV incidence in the United States shifted dramatically in 2008 when a transformative 
article about HIV estimates surfaced in the Journal of the American Medical Association.  See H. Irene Hall et al., 
Estimation of HIV Incidence in the United States, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 520, 520 (2008) (detailing a study that 
“provides the first direct estimates of HIV incidence in the United States using laboratory technologies previously 
implemented only in clinic-based settings”). 
56 See id. at 525 (commenting that the previous method based on extrapolating from convenience samples estimated 
HIV incidence at about 40,000 new infections each year).  
57 See id. at 526 (explaining that incidence increased nationally at the end of the 1990s although it remained stable 
and later declined among injection drug users). 
58 See id. at 520 (estimating HIV incidence at around 55,400 new infections between 2003 and 2006 and 56,300 new 
infections for the year 2006 and explaining that HIV incidence increased in the mid-1990s, declined after 1999, and 
has remained stable ever since). 
59 New HIV Infections in the United States, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/2012/HIV-Infections-2007-2010.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
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because many individuals living with HIV have not been tested or reported.60  Those who are 
undiagnosed are believed to disproportionately contribute to new infections, and this has led 
researchers to advocate that increased access to testing and care could serve to prevent new cases 
and improve disease surveillance.61  Nevertheless, epidemiologists have projected that more than 
1.7 million individuals have been infected with HIV in the United States since 1981,62 and an 
increasing number of Americans are living with HIV annually.63  At the end of 2006, roughly 1.1 
million HIV-infected individuals resided in the United States,64 and about one-fifth of those 
cases were undiagnosed.65  
Although large percentages of people living with hemophilia were infected with HIV in 
the 1980s,66 HIV has primarily thrived among socially marginalized and politically 
disempowered communities.  Men who have sex with men comprised the largest percentage of 
new infections early in the epidemic,67 although injection drug users also experienced an over-
representation in the initial outbreak. 68  From the outset, black Americans faced higher rates of 
HIV infection than other racial groups.69  Today, men who have sex with men and most non-
white populations continue to dominate new infections.70 
 HIV stigma refers to the impact of labeling, negative attributions, segregation, and 
discrimination on the political, social, and financial existence of individuals living with HIV.71  
HIV stigma has been difficult to measure,72 but it has been constant throughout the pandemic and 
                                                
60 See Michael L. Campsmith et al., Undiagnosed HIV Prevalence Among Adults and Adolescents in the United 
States at the End of 2006, 53 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 619, 619 (2010) (stating that “the 
overall prevalence of persons living with HIV cannot be directly observed, as a percentage of persons infected with 
HIV has not yet been tested, diagnosed, and reported to local disease surveillance programs”). 
61 See id. (noting that research has indicated that those infected but not diagnosed disproportionately contribute to 
annual HIV infections and explaining that “increasing the number of HIV-infected persons who are diagnosed and 
linked with effective care and prevention programs have the potential to significantly reduce new HIV infections”). 
62 HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HIV/AIDS POLICY FACT SHEET (2012), available at 
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/3029-13.pdf. 
63 See Campsmith et al., supra note 60, at 622 (“The number of persons in the United States living with HIV 
infection continues to increase each year.”). 
64 See id. at 620 (“At the end of 2006, there were an estimated 1,106,400 . . . persons living with HIV infection in the 
United States.”). 
65 See id. at 621 (reporting that twenty-one percent of estimated prevalent HIV cases were undiagnosed at the end of 
2006). 
66 See Curran et al., supra note 52, at 612 (reporting that a conglomeration of HIV seroprevalence surveys conducted 
among people living with hemophilia showed prevalence ranges between fifteen and over ninety percent depending 
on severity of hemophilia). 
67 See id. at 610 (noting that sixty-five percent of reported HIV cases were among men who had sex with men and 
did not inject drugs while an additional eight percent of all HIV cases occurred among men who had sex men and 
injected drugs). 
68 See id. (“More than 60% of the 13,492 cases reported in heterosexual men and women were among those with a 
history of IV drug abuse, representing 17% of total cases.”). 
69 See Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 1374 (noting that the highest prevalence rates in the United States between the 
years 1987 and 1992 were among young black men). 
70 See Hall et al., supra note 55, at 520 (explaining that about half of new infections were among men who have sex 
with men and black Americans). 
71 See Laura C. Nyblade, Measuring HIV Stigma: Existing Knowledge and Gaps, 11 PSYCHOL. HEALTH & MED. 
335, 336 (2006) (employing stigma as a proxy for the processes through which social and cognitive labeling, 
negative attributions about human differences, separation schemas, and discrimination “converge in the context of 
social, economic and political power”).  
72 See id. at 341 (explaining that studies attempting to measure enacted stigma in the general population could not be 
found in a literature review because “[t]he very presence of stigma means that asking any survey questions about a 
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has created a bidirectional layering effect with the preexisting stigmatization already experienced 
by the populations at highest risk for infection.73  The initial outbreak among men who have sex 
with men and injection drug users stoked prejudice and facilitated early theories representing 
HIV as the consequence of certain lifestyles and choices.74  In the United States, the 
encouragement of severely castigatory manifestations of HIV stigma declined by 1990 as support 
for quarantine and public identification of people living with AIDS dropped among American 
adults to approximately one-in-five.75  A large portion of the United States continued to fear 
individuals living with AIDS, and an increasing number of individuals believed that those 
infected through sex or drug use deserved their illness.76  Today, many individuals as well as 
medical and social institutions—including those responsible for HIV care—continue to 
stigmatize individuals based on their status.77 
 2. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
HIV stigma has risen at both individual and institutional levels,78 crippling the American 
relief effort and validating inequality.79  The negative effects of stigma have been amplified by 
the course of HIV infection in the United States; HIV has ravaged populations with traditionally 
limited access to medical institutions, and this has been especially problematic for ensuring HIV 
care services reach those individuals who are in greatest need.80   
                                                                                                                                                       
respondent’s HIV status to the general public is unacceptable, removing the possibility of asking respondents 
whether they themselves have experienced HIV stigma”).   
73 See id. (stating that compound or layered stigma lacks measurement at the population level and is common among 
groups like men who have sex with men, sex workers, and injection drug users). 
74 See Warner C. Greene, A History of AIDS: Looking Back to See Ahead, 37 EUR. J. IMMUNOLOGY S94, S94 (2007) 
(discussing how theories about the cause of HIV focused on “lifestyle” issues during the early epidemic and how 
speculation about intravenous drug users, men who have sex with men, and HIV’s origins in Haiti fostered fear and 
prejudice). 
75 See Gregory M. Herek et al., HIV-Related Stigma and Knowledge in the United States: Prevalence and Trends, 
1991-1999, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 371, 375 (2002) (discussing survey trends that found “[t]he most punitive 
aspects of AIDS stigma—support for quarantine and public identification of PWAs—diminished considerably [in 
the 1990s], with fewer than 1 in 5 adults still supporting such measures by 1999”). 
76 See id. at 375–76 (claiming that “it is disturbing that in 1999—nearly 2 decades after the beginning of the AIDS 
epidemic in the United States—one fifth of those surveyed still feared PWAs,” and reporting that “[t]he proportion 
of adults believing that a person infected with HIV through sex or drug use deserves to have AIDS increased over 
the decade, peaking in 1997”).  
77 See Judy E. Mill et al., Stigmatization as a Social Control Mechanism for Persons Living with HIV and AIDS, 20 
QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 1469, 1473–75 (2010) (describing people living with HIV who experienced AIDS-
motivated shunning by their community, felt judged by their health care providers based on their status, and attended 
institutions that placed “caution sheets” on their charts to alert providers of their condition). 
78 See id. at 1470 (noting that “AIDS stigma has long been conceptualized as a personal attribute that evokes 
discrimination” but arguing that “there is a need to understand how stigma influences professional and 
organizational practice and permeates health policy”). 
79 See Richard Parker & Peter Aggleton, HIV and AIDS-related Stigma and Discrimination: A Conceptual 
Framework and Implications for Action, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 13, 16 (2003) (asserting that “we need to reframe our 
understandings of stigmatization and discrimination to conceptualize them as social processes that can only be 
understood in relation to broader notions of power and domination”).   For an influential analysis of the expansive 
role of social control in Western society, see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 28 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1977) (contemplating “power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them 
by turning them into objects of knowledge”). 
80 See Karon et al., supra note 48, at 1067 (reporting that HIV is concentrated in populations such as racial and 
ethnic minorities, women, and the poor, which are groups who have historically experienced low access to health 
services and whose poor access has made it harder to employ effective HIV prevention).  Additionally, surveillance 
efforts have failed to adequately track certain high-risk groups, including sex workers and detainees.  See Curran et 
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Distrust and elements of punishment have permeated the United States’ response to the 
AIDS crisis.  Since the beginning of the pandemic, HIV stigma has coalesced with advocates’ 
calls for specially tailored policies to confront the disease, which has contributed to HIV 
exceptionalism and encouraged the allocation of HIV-specific resources and processes outside 
the realm of typical disease control.81  Lawmakers’ opinions about HIV policy have divided 
along political fault lines.  Although HIV advocates have eschewed partner notification regimes 
and the expansion of universal testing programs, conservatives have expressed profound 
disapproval for empirically supported82 prevention strategies like syringe exchange programs and 
less-stigmatizing,83 more comprehensive sexuality education.84  Accordingly, individuals living 
with HIV were barred from entering the United States in 1987 for over two decades and 
Congress prohibited the use of federal funds for syringe exchange programs in 1988—a 
prohibition that remains in effect.85 
Despite HIV’s grossly disproportionate, devastating impact on black Americans and men 
who have sex with men,86 policymakers passed emergency AIDS relief legislation after a white 
child named Ryan White garnered their attention and interest.87  Ryan was a boy living with 
hemophilia and AIDS who became a symbol of HIV stigma88 after being banned from school in 
1985 on the basis of his HIV status.89  A few months after Ryan’s death in April 1990, Congress 
passed the Ryan White CARE Act to provide states with federal relief to address HIV treatment 
                                                                                                                                                       
al., supra note 52, at 613 (“Relatively few data are available from studies of male or female prostitutes or 
incarcerated persons.”). 
81 See Thomas R. Frieden et al., Applying Public Health Principles to the HIV Epidemic, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2397, 2397 (2005) (attributing advocacy for HIV exceptionalism—as signified by “special resources and increased 
funding and . . . the application of standard methods of disease control”—to early responses, including violence, the 
notion that AIDS is a form of retribution, and proposals for quarantine and mandatory tattooing). 
82 See Fauci, supra note 38, at 1048 (cataloguing approaches to HIV prevention that researchers have found to be 
effective, including “education and behavior modification, the promotion and provision of condoms, the treatment of 
other sexually transmitted diseases, drug-abuse treatment (for example, methadone maintenance for injection-drug 
users), access to clean needles and syringes for injection-drug users, and the use of antiretroviral drugs to interrupt 
transmission of the virus from mother to infant”). 
83 See Shatz, supra note 40, at 528 (“Abstinence-only education teaches that sex can properly occur only between a 
man and a woman within the confines of marriages; it condemns homosexual sex of any kind, since gays and 
lesbians currently can marry in only one state.”)  For a more detailed analysis of the stigmatizing effects of 
abstinence-only education on parents and young people living with HIV, see RACHAEL D. DOMBROWSKI & DIANA 
K. BRUCE, AIDS ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, IN A POSITION TO KNOW: YOUTH AND PARENTS 
LIVING WITH HIV SPEAK OUT ON SEXUALITY EDUCATION (2008), available at http://www.aids-
alliance.org/policy/positiveyouthproject/positive-youth-report.pdf. 
84 See Frieden et al., supra note 81, at 2397 (addressing the political costs of moving past HIV exceptionalism by 
taking a more traditional disease-control approach and identifying members of both political sides who could be 
offended: “conservatives who oppose the implementation of effective prevention programs, including syringe 
exchange and the widespread availability of condoms, and some HIV activists who oppose expansion of testing, 
notification of partners of infected person . . . and what some see as inappropriate ‘medicalization’ of the response to 
the epidemic”). 
85 Greene, supra note 74, at S96. 
86 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
87 Greene, supra note 74, at S96. 
88 See Patricia D. Siplon, Washington’s Response to the AIDS Epidemic: The Ryan White CARE Act, 27 POL’Y 
STUD. J. 796, 796 (1999) (observing that Ryan White became “a powerful symbol of discrimination and obstacles 
faced by people with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome”). 
89 Greene, supra note 74, at S95. 
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and prevention.90  Congress generally intended the legislation to deliver aid to the most affected 
areas of the United States,91 although it has been interpreted as the payer of last resort in meeting 
the demands of the AIDS crisis.92   
This groundbreaking law, which has evolved greatly over the course of subsequent 
reauthorizations, was a complex response to the pandemic.  In brief, Title I of the Ryan White 
CARE Act provided disaster relief directly to the hardest hit areas of the United States, Title II 
granted funds to every state, and Title III funded proposals from community entities to foster 
early intervention.93  However, Title IV—the legislative carve-out for women, youth, and 
children—was unfunded for fiscal years 1991 through 1993 and functioned purely as a 
legislative memorial to Ryan, suggesting that Congress believed that the populations most in 
need of HIV relief were not those after whom they had branded their flagship relief effort.94  
Moreover, in line with recommendations from Reagan’s Presidential Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus,95 the Act originally featured a mandate for state laws to criminalize the 
transmission of HIV.96   
 The Ryan White CARE Act gave money to states and communities rather than directly to 
individuals living with HIV.  Consumers of HIV services have frequently lacked control over the 
health policy decisions that have shaped their lives.  Individuals living with HIV have advised 
their providers about administering health services but have not directly assumed the role of 
decision maker,97 although some degree of consumer involvement has become necessary to 
                                                
90 Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–381, 104 Stat. 576 
(1990).  Previously, the deaths of a mother named Elizabeth Glaser living with hemophilia who had contracted HIV 
through blood products and her perinatally infected daughter galvanized research efforts and resulted in the 
formation of the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation.  See Greene, supra note 74, at S94 (recalling how 
numerous new infections arose in the early and mid-1980s due to American blood banks’ inability to test for HIV 
and refusal to screen for imperfect surrogate markers such as Hepatitis B, and conveying how the deaths of 
Elizabeth and Ariel Glaser caused an outcry for improved research as well as formation of the Elizabeth Glaser 
Pediatric AIDS Foundation). 
91 Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–381, 104 Stat. 576 
(1990). 
92 See Erika G. Martin et al., Faction, Fiction, and Fairness: Resource Allocation Under the Ryan White CARE Act, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1103 (2006) (observing that although the original legislation stated Congress intended to 
provide resources to those areas with the greatest HIV/AIDS burden, “[p]ulling in another direction is the principle 
that the RWCA should serve effectively (although not legally) as a ‘payer of last resort’”). 
93 For a more detailed analysis of the initial Ryan White CARE Act legislation, see Siplon, supra note 88, at 799-
802 (explaining that Title I funded metropolitan areas hardest hit by the epidemic, Title II funded every state based 
on cumulative caseloads and fiscal capacities, and Title III funded individual proposals made by public and 
nonprofit organizations to facilitate early intervention). 
94 See id. at 802 (“Title IV was destined to be the least important provision of the Act, and in fact was not funded 
during Fiscal Years 1991-93.”). 
95 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC 131 (1988), available at 
http://www.archive.org/download/reportofpresiden00pres/reportofpresiden00pres.pdf. 
96 See Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act § 101, Pub. L. No.101-381, § 2647, 104 Stat. 
576, 603 (1990) (conditioning federal funds on state criminalization of the intentional transmission of HIV or a state 
evincing that it possessed a preexisting statutory framework to prosecute individuals for intentionally transmitting 
HIV).  
97 See P. Meyer, Consumer Representation in Multi-Site HIV, Mental Health, and Substance Abuse Research: The 
HIV/AIDS Treatment Adherence, Health Outcomes and Cost Study, 16 AIDS CARE S137, S138 (2004) (noting that 
consumer advisory boards have acted in an advisory capacity in the HIV/AIDS field since 1985, although they have 
not served a decision-making function). 
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receive government grants for HIV research and treatment.98  Administrators have struggled to 
include consumers in planning and service provision while regularly questioning the necessary 
extent of consumers’ control and limiting consumer selection to those with whom administrators 
were most familiar.99  Yet, meaningful input from consumers is widely considered advantageous 
to the success of HIV treatment and research in terms of maintaining cultural appropriateness, 
building trust, ensuring that service providers and researchers are responsive to the populations 
they serve, and improving the lives of the consumers themselves—for whom HIV treatment and 
research are conducted in the first place.100  
B. A NEW APPROACH TO SURVIVING AIDS 
Despite such dire stakes, the United States’ government has often been too preoccupied 
with ideological judgments to provide a measured response to the AIDS pandemic.  One of a 
great many examples arose when American officials participated in international relief efforts 
during the beginning of the twenty-first century and advocated for the removal of language about 
harm reduction—a concept that was too far removed from the country’s abstinence-only 
approach to sex and drug use.101  In the process, the Bush Administration and its allies espoused 
ideology over evidence in formulating international AIDS policy.102  Beyond its impact on HIV 
incidence, the United States’ abstinence-only approach to HIV prevention further alienated the 
country on the international stage during the Iraq War.103 
Still, hope has always remained for a more successful, internationally acceptable, 
evidence-based response.  The Obama Administration has represented a radical shift in 
American AIDS policy, and its National HIV/AIDS Strategy emblematized the government’s 
new awareness of HIV stigma.104  Now, policymakers in the United States must harness the anti-
stigma message while moving forward with a comprehensive, multi-sectorial approach to 
addressing HIV.105  
                                                
98 See id. (observing that federal agencies such as the Health Resources and Services Administration and the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration mandate consumer involvement in the application 
process and through advisory boards while Ryan White Planning Councils similarly foster consumer participation). 
99 See id. at S139 (explaining that administrators struggle to involve consumers, question how much power 
consumer advisory boards should have, and often select their favorite consumers for representative roles). 
100 See id. at S138-39 (reviewing literature on consumer involvement and finding that consumer representation 
benefited services and research as well as consumers in numerous ways, and advantages of consumer involvement 
included maintaining cultural awareness, establishing trust, informing researchers and providers about the changing 
needs of the community, and empowering consumers to become better leaders and professionals). 
101 See Wodak, supra note 32, at 2 (describing the United States’ efforts to remove the phrases “harm reduction” and 
“needle syringe programmes” from a prevention policy paper by the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS). 
102 See id. at 1–3 (discussing how the United States’ anomalous international AIDS policies increased since the 
election of President George W. Bush, recalling that only six of the thirty-five individuals from the United States’ 
War on Drugs organizations that advocated against needle exchange programs had medical degrees, and detailing 
the ways in which the United States’ approach to HIV and substance abuse prevention have differed from the 
approaches of other developed countries). 
103 See id. at 1, 3 (arguing that the United States had become increasingly isolated and observing that “[f]ixing ‘the 
intelligence and facts on the policy’ has trapped the United States of America into a military quagmire in Iraq and 
contributed to looming economic problems” while “[f]ixing ‘the intelligence and facts on the policy’ for illicit drugs 
. . . ensured tragic health, social and economic consequences for the United States of America”). 
104 See infra Part II.B.1. 
105 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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 1. THE NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY 
The Strategy took shape during various interactions between the White House Office of 
National AIDS Policy (ONAP) and strategic stakeholders throughout the United States.106  
ONAP hosted fourteen town hall discussions with thousands of Americans, conducted a number 
of topic-specific meetings among HIV experts, and worked with governmental and community 
entities to organize additional outreach events.107  ONAP continuously involved individuals 
living with HIV in light of the understanding described by President Obama that “[p]eople living 
with HIV have transformed how we engage community members in setting policy, conducting 
research, and providing services.”108 
The Strategy set priorities rather than deliver an exhaustive list of needed changes for 
domestic AIDS policy.109  It embraced three primary goals: reduce the number of individuals 
becoming infected, improve access to care and the health of individuals living with HIV, and 
reduce HIV-related health disparities.110  The Strategy clearly prioritized the lives of individuals 
living with HIV by designating their improved access to care and better health as one of the 
Strategy’s three central goals.111  In addition, it maintained a focus on individuals already living 
with HIV by giving priority to eliminating Americans’ common misperceptions about the risk 
for HIV transmission through casual contact,112 acknowledging the history of poor health care 
that many people living with HIV have experienced,113 and promoting new services that respond 
to the diverse beliefs, practices, and cultures of patients.114  The Strategy did not rely on the 
symbol of a white child to elicit compassion for individuals living with HIV; it asked for the 
United States to reorient its efforts around those groups at highest risk for HIV infection: men 
who have sex with men, black men and women, Latinos and Latinas, and drug users.115   
 The Strategy’s implementation guide recognized the social mistreatment of people living 
with HIV in explicit language: 
Addressing ongoing stigma and discrimination is perhaps the biggest challenge 
we face, as this is not about what government does as much as it is about 
changing hearts and minds among members of the public.  At the same time, three 
decades of experience tell us that essential starting points for addressing stigma 
and discrimination include maintaining a commitment to civil rights enforcement, 
working to ensure that public policies are grounded in best public health practices, 
                                                
106 NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 27, at 3. 
107 Id. 
108 Letter from Barrack Obama (July 13, 2010), in NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE U.S., supra note 27. 
109 NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE U.S., supra note 27, at 3 (“This document provides a roadmap to move the 
Nation forward in responding to the domestic HIV epidemic.  It is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all 
activities needed to address HIV/AIDS in the United States, but is intended to be a concise plan that identifies a set 
of priorities and strategic action steps tied to measurable outcomes.”). 
110 Id. at 1. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 19. 
113 Id. at 26.  The Strategy offered examples of this history of poor health care such as historically supported mistrust 
of the medical establishment among black Americans, heterosexual health care providers feeling too uncomfortable 
to ask about the sexual history of sexual minorities when doing so was appropriate, and the particular challenge 
faced by transgender individuals to find providers who respect them and with whom they can have honest 
discussions about hormone use.  Id. 
114 Id. at 26. 
115 Id. at 11.  Further, the Strategy emphasizes that many members in these groups do not engage in riskier behaviors 
than individuals in other populations.  Id. at 12. 
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and supporting people living with HIV to disclose their status and promote the 
public leadership of community members living with HIV.116 
In general, the Strategy moved beyond broad gestures of support to adapt old approaches 
to evolving, evidence-based advances in health policy.117  Thus, after acknowledging the 
challenge of addressing HIV stigma, the Strategy proposed meaningful changes to the policy 
landscape by conveying new caution about statutes that criminalize HIV,118 prioritizing the 
investigation of discrimination claims made by people living with HIV,119 asking the Department 
of Justice to scrutinize HIV-specific sentencing laws,120 and demanding the improved 
enforcement of civil rights laws.121  In addition, the Strategy called for governmental and 
community stakeholders to work together to ensure people living with HIV are empowered as 
leaders122—a far cry from twenty-five years prior when President Reagan called children living 
with AIDS “that problem.”123 
 2. HARNESSING THE STRATEGY IN POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 
The Strategy’s anti-stigma message should extend to other important opportunities for 
improvement, including the integration of HIV care across the spectrum of health services, 
criminal justice reform, and the grant of substantive decision-making power to individuals living 
with HIV.  While much improved, the struggle against stigma for individuals living with HIV 
continues and the fight to end AIDS is not yet won.  Heightened stigmatization is linked to 
increased levels of fear and anxiety among people living with HIV, which obstructs HIV 
prevention and improved health.124  Accordingly, confronting and eliminating HIV stigma is not 
only a matter of social justice; it is wholly necessary to all levels of an effective health relief 
effort.125  
Reform to meet today’s pandemic must integrate HIV prevention, care, and treatment 
into various other areas of health policy rather than continue to separate HIV from other health 
                                                
116 NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 27, at 23. 
117 See Gregorio A. Millet et al., A Way Forward: The National HIV/AIDS Strategy and Reducing HIV Incidence in 
the United States, 55 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME S144, S146 (2010) (claiming that “the 
innovation of the national strategy lies in its commitment to building on an evolving evidence base of what works, in 
identifying common national goals toward which federal, state, local, and tribal governmental partners and 
community partners can align their efforts, and in a renewed commitment to collaboration and coordination”). 
118 NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY: FED. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 27, at 26 (“State legislatures should 
consider reviewing HIV-specific criminal statutes to ensure that they are consistent with current knowledge of HIV 
transmission and support public health approaches to screening for, preventing and treating HIV.”). 
119 Id. (“DOJ, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, DOL’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
Programs, and HUD’s Fair Housing Enforcement Office will prioritize and fast track investigations of 
discrimination charges involving HIV, as necessary and appropriate under relevant statutes, and consider additional 
policies to prevent discrimination from occurring.”). 
120 Id. (“DOJ will examine and report on HIV-specific sentencing laws and implications for people living with 
HIV.”). 
121 Id. (“The Department of Justice and other Federal agencies must enhance cooperation to facilitate enforcement of 
Federal antidiscrimination laws.”). 
122 Id. at 25 (“Governments and other institutions . . . should work with . . . AIDS coalitions, HIV services 
organizations, and other institutions to actively promote public leadership by people living with HIV.”). 
123 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
124 See Malcolm et al., supra note 36, at 350 (explaining that fear and anxiety remain high among individuals 
diagnosed with HIV and who experience negative responses toward people living with the virus and that they 
become afraid to reveal their status to others). 
125 See id. at 348 (claiming that the “epidemic of fear, stigmatization and discrimination” that has accompanied HIV 
“has posed a challenge to those who are concerned about providing not only an effective response to HIV/AIDS but 
also a humane one, based on a concern for human rights and the principles of social justice”). 
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and social issues.  Over the course of the pandemic, support for HIV exceptionalism has 
waned.126  The isolation of HIV services from other medical interventions is particularly 
problematic in the modern era because, as the number of individuals living with HIV in the 
United States increases each year, the funding for HIV initiatives decreases, perpetuating the 
cycle of poor prevention, undiagnosed incidence, and heightened prevalence.127 
Every institution must question to what extent its work contributes to HIV 
stigmatization.128  For instance, when state and federal legislators pass statutes to outlaw HIV 
transmission, they perpetuate HIV stigma rather than meaningfully working toward ending the 
HIV pandemic.  Criminalizing transmission does not call upon the uninfected to engage in safer 
behaviors and unfairly assigns responsibility for stemming the spread of HIV solely to those 
already living with the virus.129  Most individuals living with HIV already express a sense of 
duty to disclose their diagnosis to their sexual partners, but individuals who are unaware of their 
status are those most likely to infect others.130  Therefore, statutes that criminalize infection 
contribute to stigma and reinforce HIV exceptionalism, consequently failing to promote 
prevention of the spread of HIV, which depends on increased diagnosis and care for individuals 
who may not know they are infected.131   
Adequate reform requires changes to existing policy and laws that have a 
disproportionately negative effect across vulnerable populations.  For example, drug control laws 
have a disparate racial impact.132  In turn, incarceration leads to increased risk for HIV infection 
as well as greater institutional distrust.  Thus, altered drug control laws should delimit their 
negative impact on public health.133  Moreover, stigma must be addressed across the entire policy 
landscape.  Just as an improved response to stigma within the realm of HIV policy could benefit 
                                                
126 See Ronald Bayer & Claire Edington, HIV Testing, Human Rights, and Global AIDS Policy: Exceptionalism and 
Its Discontents, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 301, 320 (2009) (“If at the moment of its emergence the 
exceptionalist perspective had provided an almost universally accepted understanding of what the new global threat 
to health required, twenty years later, in the face of changing therapeutic prospects and of a vast pandemic burden, 
the earlier view no longer commanded such allegiance.”). 
127 See H. Irene Hall et al., Estimated Future HIV Prevalence, Incidence, and Potential Infections Averted in the 
United States: A Multiple Scenario Analysis, 55 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 271, 271 (2010) 
(observing that reductions to state and local allocations for HIV services and the growing number of individuals in 
need “raise questions about the feasibility of continuing to reduce the HIV transmission rate in the United States 
without further expanding and improving the efficiency and impact of HIV prevention and treatment”). 
128 See Mill et al., supra note 77, at 1480 (concluding that health care providers and institutions must evaluate 
policies and determine how to best meet individuals’ needs in light of “the underlying social inequalities 
experienced by clients with HIV, and in particular those with layered stigma and those who have experienced social 
oppression”). 
129 See Klemm, supra note 42, at 512 (noting various problems that arise from criminalizing the transmission of 
HIV, including the disproportionate impact of such statutes on men who have sex with men, mistakenly limiting 
HIV prevention to only the HIV-positive, and diminishing the public health message that individuals share 
responsibility for their sexual health). 
130 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
131 See Klemm, supra note 42, at 511–12 (stating that research indicates that the majority of those living with HIV 
feel a duty to disclose, criminal enforcement of this duty amplifies stigma, and HIV is the only sexually transmitted 
infection that states have chosen to criminalize to such a great extent even though similarly transmitted infections 
have grave consequences). 
132 See Cari Cason et al., The Impact of Laws on HIV and STD Prevention, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 139, 144 (2002) 
(“Substantial evidence demonstrates that drug control laws, as currently defined and enforced, have racially 
disparate impacts.”). 
133 See id. (explaining how higher incarceration rates contribute to increased HIV risk due to poor drug treatment 
and risky sexual behaviors in prisons). 
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disproportionately affected populations in other realms of their lives, an effective response to 
stigma across layers of governance could similarly improve the social power and health 
resources of individuals living with HIV.134 
Individuals personally affected by and living with HIV can and should make decisions 
about the policies designed to help them.  HIV-diagnosed individuals already work to shape and 
control the social implications of their health by facing the daily task of participating in or 
abstaining from the public identification of their status, and their providers should harness this 
inevitability when engaging consumers of HIV services rather than ignore or fear it.135  Existing 
challenges to consumer involvement could be overcome if consumers were invited to 
confidentially or openly work with researchers and service providers at the inception of their 
initiatives, if every level within organizations committed to the implementation of consumer 
involvement programs, and if researchers and service providers made special efforts to 
acknowledge the power differential between staff members and consumers.136  Additionally, 
because stigma materializes within particular social and historical contexts,137 individuals living 
with HIV are best situated to adequately respond to stigma across their diverse cultural 
backgrounds.138  The empowerment of individuals living with HIV to make policy decisions 
directly counteracts the devaluing function of HIV stigma, improving prevention and treatment 
outcomes.139 
 
III. LESSONS FROM A PLAGUE 
While these reforms are generally characterized by integrating HIV into the American 
response to other social and health issues, AIDS advocates have continuously and 
unapologetically employed tactics outside mainstream political discourse to raise HIV-specific 
awareness.  As an example, on November 27, 2012, activists protested potential budget cuts to 
AIDS funding stemming from fiscal cliff negotiations.140  Fifty activists—many living with 
HIV—traveled to House Speaker John Boehner’s congressional office.141  Four women and three 
men entered the office in the middle of the work day and removed their clothing, revealing hand-
painted slogans on their naked bodies such as “AIDS Cuts Kill” and “Fund HOPWA,”142 the 
                                                
134 See Mill et al., supra note 77, at 1478 (discussing findings that adequate responses to HIV stigma could mitigate 
inequities by promoting empowerment and political activism among marginalized communities). 
135 See id. at 1479 (“Persons living with HIV and AIDS attempted to take control of their respective situation as a 
strategy to manage stigma.  The process of balancing decisions about disclosure with the need for secrecy is an 
example of PHAs exerting social control.”). 
136 See Meyer, supra note 97, at S140 (describing several recommendations to overcome the challenges of consumer 
involvement, including early involvement in initiatives, committing to involvement across different levels of the 
organization, and acknowledging power differentials). 
137 See Parker & Aggleton, supra note 79, at 17 (“It is vitally important to recognize that stigma arises and 
stigmatization takes shape in specific contexts of culture and power.  Stigma always has a history which influences 
when it appears and the form it takes.”). 
138 See id. at 14 (“Much of what has been written about stigma and discrimination in the context of HIV and AIDS 
has emphasized the complexity of these phenomena, and has attributed our inability to respond to them more 
effectively to both their complex nature and their high degree of diversity in different cultural settings.”). 
139 See id. (explaining that “stigma, understood as a negative attribute, is mapped onto people, who in turn by virtue 
of their difference, are understood to be negatively valued in society”). 
140 Peter Hermann, AIDS Activists Arrested After Stripping in House Speaker’s Office, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/aids-activists-arrested-after-stripping-in-house-
speakers-office/. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
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Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS program.143  The nude demonstrators, along with 
dozens of clothed protesters, chanted: “People with AIDS are under attack!  What do we do?  
Fight back!”144  A protest organizer explained, “[w]e wanted to strip away the rhetoric of the 
fiscal cliff.”145  In the midst of politically charged fiscal cliff negotiations, “we’re concerned that 
real lives left in the balance will be lost,” leading AIDS advocates to believe “we should do 
something outrageous to get our message across.”146  The fiscal cliff cuts were ultimately 
averted, but, as one protester living with HIV observed, “just the idea of these programs being 
cut is horrible.”147 Another explained, “we need to make sure they stop going after people with 
AIDS.”148  
The protesters in Speaker Boehner’s office were contemporary participants in a powerful 
legacy of AIDS activism through which advocates have recognized the American government’s 
growing role as a regulator and problem solver and rejected the government’s discriminatory 
neglect.149  As President Obama acknowledged in his introduction to the National HIV/AIDS 
Strategy, this legacy transformed how the government “engage[s] community members in setting 
policy, conducting research, and providing services.”150  In the process, AIDS advocacy 
consumed the social movement of sexual minorities in the United States, inciting an aggressive 
defense of difference rather than a continued push toward integration.151  The influence of AIDS 
advocacy over sexual minorities has waned.  As HIV stigma has been gradually extricated from 
sexual minority status, movement elites—those with the greatest resources and representation in 
existing power structures and for whom assimilation is typically easiest and most beneficial—
have embraced an integrationist agenda that does too little for more marginalized sexual 
minorities, like transgender and non-whites individuals.152  The earlier response to the AIDS 
crisis revealed the potential for sexual minorities to represent a broader coalition of needs than 
those within its current focus.153  Informed by the lessons of the AIDS crisis, sexual minorities 
                                                
143 See generally Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA) Program, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. 
DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/aidshousing/programs (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
144 AIDS Activists Arrested in Nude Protest at House Speaker John Boehner’s Office, NY DAILY NEWS, Nov. 27, 
2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/aids-activists-arrested-nude-protest-boehner-office-article-
1.1208955 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) [hereinafter AIDS Activists Arrested]. 
145 Hermann, supra note 139. 
146 Id. 
147 AIDS Activists Arrested, supra note 144. 
148 Id. 
149 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 524 (asserting that “AIDS activism suggests a final speculation about identity 
politics in the new millennium: the changing role of state as regulator, as the state sustains or increases its role as a 
potential problem-solver,” and, after alluding to AIDS activists, stating that most new identity-based social 
movements “will accuse the state of discriminatory neglect rather than discriminatory aggression and will be seeking 
state subsidies and other interventions”). 
150 Letter from Barrack Obama (July 13, 2010), in NAT’L HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE U.S., supra note 27. 
151 See infra Part III.A.1. 
152 See infra Part III.A.2. 
153 For a contemporary examination of the importance of remembering lessons from the AIDS crisis rooted in 
sociological theory, see DEBORAH B. GOULD, MOVING POLITICS: EMOTION AND ACT UP’S FIGHT AGAINST AIDS 45 
(2009). 
What we lose if the history of AIDS activism in this country is forgotten is the memory of a 
government of a wealthy, ostensibly democratic country unmoved by the deaths of hundreds, 
thousands, and finally hundreds of thousands of its own inhabitants, largely because the 
overwhelming majority of them were gay and bisexual men, and the others were seen as similarly 
expendable: drug users as well as poor men and women, a disproportionate number of whom were 
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should adapt their advocacy agenda to better understand and prioritize the consequences of 
differences outside as well as within their movement.154 
A. THE RISE AND FALL OF LIBERATION 
Although AIDS was a cross-cutting issue disproportionately affecting some but not all 
members of certain marginalized groups,155 medical experts implicated all sexual minorities 
early in the AIDS crisis by labeling the syndrome’s symptoms “gay-related immune 
deficiency.”156  The mainstream press followed suit, reporting on “gay-related immune 
deficiency” but ignoring what would become known as acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
for long periods except to leverage the American epidemic to broadcast homophobia.157  
Unsurprisingly, the AIDS crisis fundamentally transformed the social movement of sexual 
minorities in the United States, emboldening a nationwide, liberationist approach to identity-
based activism.158  As HIV has gradually mainstreamed, integrationist priorities have reclaimed 
sexual minorities, allowing movement elites to ignore smaller minorities within their group for 
whom marriage equality does not take priority.159 
 1. LIBERATION SAVED LIVES 
In the wake of the initial AIDS crisis, advocates for sexual minorities fell into two 
predominant camps: one was an integrationist, centrist collection that endeavored for marriage 
and additional heterosexual privileges while the other, liberationist crowd pushed for sexual 
liberty and the deregulation of sexuality.160  Even though some members of each camp viewed 
AIDS as a distraction, both liberationists and integrationists were eventually forced to recognize 
that any political agenda must address AIDS.161  According to activist Simon Watney, “AIDS is 
                                                                                                                                                       
black and Latino/a.  We are at risk of losing as well the history of lesbian/gay/queer collective 
political resistance in the face of the government’s aggressive indifference, extreme negligence, 
and punitive policies regarding AIDS. 
Id. 
154 See infra Part III.B. 
155 See CATHY J. COHEN, THE BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF BLACK POLITICS 13, 14 
(1999) (defining cross-cutting political issues as “those concerns which disproportionately and directly affect only 
certain segments of a marginal group” and explaining that “AIDS and drug use in black communities, as well as the 
extreme, isolated poverty disproportionately experienced by black women—all issues which disproportionately and 
directly affect poor, less empowered, and ‘morally wanting’ segments of black communities”—are categorical 
cross-cutting political issues). 
156 See CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 99 (2002). 
157 Id. 
158 See infra Part II.A.1. 
159 See infra Part II.A.2. 
160 See generally Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 13 (2004) (“Gay centrism 
moved towards marriage rights, and gay liberationism moved towards sexual liberty and the world-making 
(bathhouses, elaborate sexual subcultures, and so on) that might sustain it; the movement split, intellectually and 
politically.”). 
161 See SIMON WATNEY, POLICING DESIRE: PORNOGRAPHY, AIDS, AND THE MEDIA XII (3d ed. 1997). 
For example, some lesbians and gay men continue to regard Aids [sic] as a distraction from what 
they see as the central business of gay politics—whether from a liberationist or from an 
integrationist perspective.  This is why we must continually insist that such issues cannot be easily 
resolved.  None the less [sic] it is equally important to insist that there can be no effective gay 
politics that does not take into account the multiple effects of Aids both inside and outside our 
tentative communities.  Aids [sic] is not merely an unfortunate but negotiable “incident” in the 
supposedly inevitable achievement of gay civil rights.  On the contrary, it is a crisis that threatens 
to erase gay identity altogether. 
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not only a medical crisis on an unparalleled scale, it involves a crisis of representation itself, a 
crisis over the entire framing of knowledge about the human body and its capacities for sexual 
pleasure.”162 
In light of mass death, egregious homophobia, and government inaction, the 
premeditation required to tailor advocacy agendas to an integrationist or liberationist perspective 
soon became an indefensible luxury.163  And without measured tailoring, AIDS quickly resulted 
in a series of mobilization moments during which liberationists dominated the sexual minority 
movement.164  After initial state inaction, sexual minorities leveraged the tenets of its past 
liberation movement to convey sexually explicit HIV prevention messages, saving lives while 
publicly embracing the political dimensions of sexuality.165  Advocates rejected individual 
solutions and instead called for an outright end to subjugation, connecting AIDS to oppression 
and survival to systemic transformation.166  AIDS advocates forced the public to contemplate 
sexuality when the government sought to ignore it,167 and feminist men and women passionately 
litigated the meanings and practices of health and liberation.168 
During the various mobilization moments of the AIDS crisis, the AIDS Coalition to 
Unleash Power (ACT UP) demonstrated the advantages and especially the inclusiveness of 
liberation over integration.  In 1987, when the existing American status regime took a business-
as-usual approach to AIDS, ACT UP emerged from communities of sexual minorities in New 
York City and quickly spread throughout the United States.169  ACT UP merged education and 
social protest to provoke public awareness, increase funding for HIV initiatives, open the rolls of 
experimental research trials, and improve the accessibility of HIV treatment.170  Its sex-positive, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Id. 
162 Id. at 9. 
163 See Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, in 43 AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197, 198-99  
(Douglas Crimp ed., 1987) (describing AIDS in the United States in 1987, including reactionary homophobia and 
failings of the government and the media, and explaining that, “given the nature of that starting point, analysis, 
while necessary, may also be an indefensible luxury”). 
164 This Article acknowledges that AIDS also spurred integrationist responses but concludes that liberationists 
prevailed, albeit temporarily.  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM 
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 82 (1996) (arguing that AIDS was a wake-up call for men who have 
sex with men “in need of civilizing” and that “marriage could be a particularly useful commitment device”). 
165 See JENNIFER BRIER, INFECTIOUS IDEAS: U.S. POLITICAL RESPONSES TO THE AIDS CRISIS 1 (2009) (explaining 
that “people with AIDS insisted that AIDS required a return to, not a departure from, the explicitly political tenets of 
gay liberation,” and while sexual minorities “talked in graphic detail about sexual practices and how those acts could 
be ‘safe,’ deploying explicit sexual images in AIDS prevention posters, they also understood that sexuality had a 
political dimension”). 
166 See id. at 12 (describing an interview with writer-activist Cindy Patton in 1983 and explaining that Patton 
“suggested that lesbians and gay men needed to see their collective health as a political problem,” echoed the 
liberation movement, and, “[b]y rejecting individual solutions and instead calling for the end to ‘straight’ 
oppression, Patton imagined a response to AIDS that would reinvigorate gays and lesbians in a struggle for more 
systemic liberation”). 
167 See id. at 1 (“People reacting to the emergent AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s inserted sexuality into the public 
sphere at a moment when the state did everything it could to avoid the subject.”). 
168 See id. at 14 (observing that feminist “gays and lesbians who had lived through the liberation movement of the 
1970s participated in a vociferous debate about the meanings and practices of health and liberation as well as the 
role gender politics might play in that discussion”). 
169 GOULD, supra note 153, at 4. 
170 See Brett C. Stockdill, ACT-UP, in PROTEST, POWER, AND CHANGE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NONVIOLENT ACTION 
FROM ACT-UP TO WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 10 (Roger Powers et al. eds., 1997) (“ACT-UP’s combination of 
provocative education and social protest has been integral in raising awareness about HIV and AIDS in the gay and 
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unapologetic methods challenged mainstream and minority conceptualizations of sexuality.171  
As sociologist and former ACT UP member Deborah Gould explained, “ACT UP queers opened 
up ways of being gay and of being political that had been foreclosed by the more mainstream-
oriented lesbian and gay establishment, paving the way for new identity and political formations 
among sexual and gender outlaws of all ages.”172 
ACT UP targeted disparaging social attitudes toward sexual minorities and people living 
with HIV and reacted with public displays of unapologetic sexuality.173  For example, to dispel 
misperceptions about HIV transmission and sexual minorities, ACT UP placed numerous posters 
on city buses in San Francisco and New York City modeled after a United Colors of Benetton 
fashion advertisement.174  The poster depicted heterosexual and same-sex men and women in 
interracial combinations kissing, with the declaration: “Kissing doesn’t kill.  Greed and 
indifference do.”175  In doing so, ACT UP rejected the notion that HIV can be transmitted 
through kissing while redirecting blame for the virus away from sexual minorities and toward the 
failure of society to respond to the AIDS crisis.176  ACT UP also regularly engaged in kiss-ins at 
the end of the 1980s, highlighting the homophobic response to AIDS through massive 
demonstrations of same-sex intimacy.177  A fact sheet distributed at a kiss-in in 1988 explained, 
“we kiss as an affirmation of our feelings, our desires, ourselves.”178 
If the existing normative regime defended inaction, ACT UP and partner groups 
intervened, forcing the Food and Drug Administration to speed up the drug-approval process and 
securing space for people living with HIV in government and corporate decision-making.179  
Activists fought for the most marginalized members of their coalitions, pushing the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to expand AIDS-defining illnesses to include those infections 
and diseases commonly occurring in HIV-infected women and the poor.180  They also advocated 
for protecting drug users through the proliferation of politically unpopular needle exchange 
programs, and they demanded greater attention to all the diverse populations experiencing AIDS, 
including an enhanced focus on women and non-white populations.181 
 2. THE RETURN TO INTEGRATION 
Of course, AIDS activism in the United States was never the exclusive province of sexual 
minorities and their allies; this became increasingly true as a greater proportion of women were 
infected and heterosexual contact was more publicly recognized for its potential to transmit 
                                                                                                                                                       
lesbian community and broader society, increasing government AIDS budgets, opening up experimental trials, and 
making treatment more accessible for people with AIDS.”).  See generally HOW TO SURVIVE A PLAGUE (Public 
Square Films 2012). 
171 GOULD, supra note 153, at 5. 
172 Id. 
173 Abigail Halcli, AIDS and Act Up, in WAVES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SINCE THE SIXTIES 143 (Jo 
Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds., 1999). 
174 Id. at 143–44. 
175 Id. at 144. 
176 Id. 
177 DAVID ROMÁN, ACTS OF INTERVENTION: PERFORMANCE, GAY CULTURE, AND AIDS 101 (1998). 
178 Id. 
179 GOULD, supra note 153, at 4. 
180 Id. at 4–5. 
181 Id. at 5. 
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HIV.182  ACT UP, which had always defined itself as an inclusive organization since springing 
from communities of sexual minorities in the 1980s, attracted an increasing number of 
heterosexuals as HIV more deeply affected different heterosexual populations.183  When the 
virus spread, HIV stigma lessened,184 and integrationist priorities dominated the social 
movement of sexual minorities.  Today’s movement is propelled by the public performance of 
respectability.185  With enough progress to ignore the life-ending consequences of being different 
that characterized the earlier AIDS crisis, the movement of sexual minorities has recast itself as 
an asexual, apolitical counterpart to the heterosexual middle class.186  Thus, the movement 
avoids discrimination by downplaying difference,187 which mutes rather than defends the 
identities of various individuals within movement subgroups.188 
Specifically, the push for marriage equality has narrowed the focus of advocacy 
efforts.189  This preoccupation with marriage is the direct result of movement elites seeking to 
moderate goals around consensus issues.190  After the initial, harrowing years of the AIDS crisis, 
the movement has formalized and professionalized,191 becoming more respectable without 
asking for more respect for difference.192  Beyond having a potential castigatory effect on the 
unmarried,193 the focus on marriage has created a political ideology in which liberationist 
priorities, such as the deregulation of sexuality and gender, cannot coexist without sacrificing 
                                                
182 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 524 (observing that AIDS activists “cut across traditional lines but are dominated 
by the poor, people of color (especially blacks and latinos), drug addicts, (decreasingly) gay and bisexual men, and 
(increasingly) women, especially women of color”). 
183 See Halcli, supra note 173, at 140, 142. 
184 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
185 See Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415, 418 (2012) (introducing a 
framework for understanding why “the newfound public recognition of gay people and relationships is contingent 
upon their acquiring a respectable social identity that is actually constituted by public performances of respectability 
and by privately queer practices”). 
186 See id. at 421–22 (asserting that same-sex marriage is a clear manifestation of respectability being measured by 
proximity to middle-class heterosexuality and that “prior constructions of gays and lesbians as asexual, apolitical, 
producing and consuming subjects have been instrumental in bringing about marriage equality”). 
187 See id. at 427 (“Queer liberationists reject this approach, countering that it is perilous to seek to escape 
discrimination by eliminating or downplaying the very difference that gives rise to it.”). 
188 Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Note, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: Clarifying Organizational Positionalities 
in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 515, 519 (2003) (arguing that when 
lawyers advocating for sexual minorities assert their clients are “‘like blacks,’ and therefore are deserving of 
particular judicial outcomes,” these lawyers produce “gay identity by appealing to the status of an established rights-
holding minority and by muting both intergroup and intragroup difference,” but “[t]he danger that lawyers will 
define the very identities of the clients they have undertaken to represent exists acutely in the impact litigation 
context, where causes often precede clients”). 
189 See NeJaime, supra note 1, at 704 (“Yet at the same time that the legal fight for marriage equality—and 
particularly the back-and-forth movement-countermovement battle in California - increased the salience of the issue 
among movement constituents, it contributed to a narrowing effect on movement goals and tactics.”). 
190 See id. at 708–09 (explaining that “the mainstreaming of LGBT rights and buy-in by private and public elites 
narrowed the range of possible goals and increased attention on a generally acceptable priority” and that “elites 
channeled movement activity toward more moderate and consensus issues”). 
191 See id. at 711 (claiming that “the LGBT movement has coalesced around a highly formalized and 
professionalized organizational structure”). 
192 See Joshi, supra note 185, at 418 (distinguishing respectability—the state of being proper and acceptable—from 
respect, which is acceptance of difference). 
193 See NeJaime, supra note 188, at 523 (“While arguably upsetting the preeminence of heterosexuality, the pursuit 
of marriage on normative grounds solidifies the outlier status of those who remain unmarried.”). 
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movement legitimacy and coherence.194  To echo queer theorist Michal Warner’s famous critique 
of marriage, the movement has itself become an institution “that is designed both to reward those 
inside it and discipline those outside it.”195 
Undoubtedly, most sexual minorities have recently benefited from positive cultural, legal, 
and policy developments, including the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,196 the election of the 
first openly bisexual member to Congress,197 and several breakthroughs on marriage.198  
Although typically less publicized than these progressions, numerous disappointments have also 
surfaced, such as the failed reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, which 
eventually extended vital new protections to sexual minorities.199  Underreported failures have 
often hit more marginalized sexual minorities harder than movement elites.  For example, 
transgender individuals—rendered invisible by integrationist priorities200—are particularly 
vulnerable to intimate partner violence but have historically experienced neglect from the 
feminist movement, which has produced most of the resources currently available to abuse 
survivors.201  While far from a magic bullet against intimate partner violence for transgender 
individuals, the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act improved access to shelters 
and other services that are vital to transgender survivors of abuse.202 
The integrationist approach is not helpful to a large segment of the movement.  
Compared to their white counterparts, black sexual minorities have experienced dramatically 
                                                
194 See Joshi, supra note 185, at 436–37 (examining “the tension that would arise in arguing that gay couples deserve 
marriage and adoption rights because they are respectable, and at the same time, making the case for public sex 
rights,” and commenting that an approach that would make both arguments “would appear ideologically incoherent 
because of the obvious tension between them”). 
195 WARNER, supra note 30, at 89. 
196 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2010). 
197 Peter O’Dowd, Sinema, First Openly Bisexual Member of Congress, Represents ‘Changing Arizona,’ NPR: IT’S 
ALL POL. (Jan. 1, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/08/168362011/sinema-first-
openly-bisexual-member-of-congress-represents-changing-arizona. 
198 Jonathan Rauch, Breakthrough! Gay Marriage Is Now Mainstream, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Nov. 7, 2012, 12:30 
PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/11/07-gay-marriage-rauch (reporting that entering the 
election having lost every state referendum or initiative on the issue—more than thirty in all—marriage equality 
supporters experienced perfect success in the 2012 election, with three states passing referenda enacting same-sex 
marriage and one other rejecting a constitutional ban).  In June 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act prohibiting federal recognition of same-sex marriage was an unconstitutional deprivation 
of equal liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013).  
The Court issued another success for marriage equality that same day, finding that proponents of California’s 
Proposition 8 did not have standing to defend the anti-same-sex marriage law in court, which resulted in the 
continuation of marriage equality in California.  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
199 See generally LGBTQ Provisions of S. 1925: Myths vs. Facts, NAT’L TASK FORCE TO END SEXUAL & DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://4vawa.org/pages/lgbtq-provisions-of-s-1925-myths-vs-facts (last visited Feb. 3, 
2013). 
200 See Stevie V. Tran & Elizabeth M. Glazer, Transgenderless, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 399, 413 (2012) 
(explaining that “[t]he movements for transgender rights developed, in part, due to the failure of mainstream gay and 
lesbian activists to acknowledge adequately the presence of transgender people in gay rights struggles from the 
beginning” and that “[t]he gender-normative model of gay identity” working to reject stereotypes about sexual 
minorities closely resembling the opposite gender has resulted in the invisibility of non-gender normative subgroups 
of sexual minorities). 
201 Kae Greenberg, Still Hidden in the Closet: Trans Women and Domestic Violence, 27 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & 
JUST. 198, 203 (2012) (“Many unique issues affecting trans women stem from the fact that their gender identity is 
met with cynicism or open hostility by society at large and also by the feminist movement, which has been a 
bulwark in the struggle against domestic violence.”). 
202 Id. at 244. 
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fewer improvements to their quality of life over the last decade despite the widespread 
perception of social advancement for all, suggesting, as the Center for American Progress has 
pointed out, that “some of the gay headline policy priorities that garnered the most research, 
analysis, and advocacy—such as marriage equality—under-serve this population when taken 
alone.”203  Marriage is especially likely to empower white, male, middle-class sexual minorities, 
but its advantages for other movement constituents are not clear.204  The embrace of marriage 
equality as a central priority funnels resources away from causes that benefit the less traditionally 
elite,205 rewarding sexual minorities for distinguishing themselves from more marginalized 
populations and undermining movement solidarity in an era of tremendous opportunity for 
across-the-board progress.206 
B. MOBILIZING FOR AN INCLUSIVE AGENDA 
Modern identity-based social movements have a different goal than past social 
movements.  While the labor movement sought the reallocation of economic rights and 
entitlements and the temperance and purity movements engaged morality politics to change 
private and public practices, identity-based social movements have fought for status.207  The 
women’s movement, for example, asked society to recognize women as equal citizens to men 
and, as a consequence of this status, deserving of control over their own reproductive 
processes.208  Sexual minorities have the power to drive law toward justice for all of its 
constituents.  The movement’s underlying goal should not be a redistribution of power but rather 
the transformation of society’s valuation of nonconforming sexual and gender identities; 
heterosexual privilege does not stem from the power to marry but the societal understanding of 
heterosexuals as social authorities.209   
Similar to the approach needed to improve the American response to HIV,210 sexual 
minorities should refocus the movement’s agenda on meeting the needs of all sexual minorities 
at every level of law and policy.  Unlike the need in the HIV context to increase integration into 
other social and legal issues,211 it is vital for sexual minorities to highlight their differences and 
not mask themselves as homogeneous counterparts to the heterosexual middle class.212  The early 
AIDS epidemic showed that integration did not keep sexual minorities alive in times of crisis,213 
and wholesale integration would ensure society’s continued neglect of sexual minorities’ distinct 
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needs.  Rather than cover up inconsistencies with heterosexuals, sexual minorities should hold to 
their differences and demand respect for them. 
As an illustration of this approach, potential reformation of public education provides an 
array of advocacy issues that deserve prioritization.  Conversations about HIV and sexual 
minorities have been paired in school settings as matters of public health, but acknowledgement 
of sexual minorities in the course of public education remains rare.214  Abstinence-only education 
programs ignore or spread lies about the efficacy of condom use, teach young people that sex is 
unhealthy outside of marriage, and ignore or condemn sexual minorities.215  Although the Obama 
Administration initially acted to shift funding away from abstinence-only approaches and toward 
evidence-based, comprehensive sexuality education, compromises made during health care 
reform funneled new funds into abstinence-only programs.216  These programs universally 
stigmatize non-heterosexuals and are therefore problematic for all sexual minorities, 
broadcasting heterosexual intimacy as “normal,” institutionalizing heteronormativity,217 and 
increasing young sexual minorities’ risk for depression, substance abuse, and homelessness.218  
These programs also perpetuate health issues such as increasing rates of gonorrhea and 
heightened risk for Hepatitis B, which are less pressing for heterosexuals than sexual 
minorities.219  Other education reforms with generally inclusive significance for sexual 
minorities include school safety policies and anti-bullying initiatives,220 improved research into 
school administrators’ disparate treatment of sexual minority youth,221 and reevaluating zero-
tolerance policies that result in harsh punishments for sexual minority students when they react 
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to identity-based harassment.222  These issues call upon advocates to highlight and defend how 
sexual minorities differ from heterosexuals. As a result, efforts are concentrated on laws and 
policies that affect virtually every movement constituent and that uniformly promote their value 
as unique participants in society. 
Tactics for achieving these and similarly inclusive advocacy goals should reflect the 
animating philosophy of AIDS activism insofar as these efforts should unapologetically serve the 
needs of as many movement constituents as possible.  Moreover, the movement should refocus 
rather than reset the existing advocacy machinery for sexual minorities in the United States, 
which has reaped many recent benefits, especially for movement elites but also for others.223  
The various strategies advocates have used to garner increased support for marriage equality 
have, undeniably, produced results.  For example, the American Foundation for Equal Rights 
(AFER) has tapped cultural, political, business, and legal elites and channeled the philanthropic 
endeavors of celebrities, corporations, conservatives, liberals, and moderates to foster marriage 
equality. 224  In the process, it has recruited big firms and high-profile lawyers to advocate for 
marriage equality in courtrooms, law schools, and media outlets across the country.225  These 
efforts improved attitudes toward sexual minorities even though shifting opinions could not 
alone produce concrete results for all movement constituents.226 
Rather than abandon past work, the resources garnered and lessons learned in the name of 
marriage equality should be leveraged toward more liberationist ends.  Of course, not every 
liberationist goal will enjoy the same elite support that marriage equality has, but certain more 
universally beneficial issues, such as education reform, could be just as palatable as marriage 
equality was when AFER first began incorporating elites to build its coalition.  The movement of 
sexual minorities need not unify under a single banner, and different advocates may champion 
distinct issues with varying degrees of integrationist support.227  At the same time, however, the 
movement should eschew the rhetoric of respectability and work toward progress without 
denying or wavering in the protection of internal and external differences.228  
Finally, although organizations like ACT UP sought to serve diverse constituencies by 
expanding their membership base,229 simply redistributing representation in sexual minority 
advocacy coalitions is not enough.  Just as integrationists have failed to represent the needs of all 
sexual minorities, a more liberationist group of advocates from traditionally non-elite 
backgrounds could not singlehandedly forge laws and policies that adequately serve movement 
constituents across the entire United States—particularly if new representatives are selected by 
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movement elites based on their harmony with existing motives.230  Future efforts should respond 
to the absence of information about the sexual minorities that have been the least visible in 
advocacy efforts. 231  The movement for sexual minorities should reject stereotypes and political 
deal making in place of comprehensive data collection about underrepresented populations and 
prioritize the empirical realities of their stakeholders.232  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Improving the lives of sexual minorities along with other populations disproportionately 
affected by HIV continues to be vital to curbing the pandemic.   Although beliefs about HIV and 
attitudes toward sexual minorities were once inextricable, advocacy agendas for advancing 
sexual minorities and stopping AIDS are no longer predicated solely on one another’s success.  
To more adequately address AIDS, the country must stop playing identity politics and begin the 
work of saving lives as set forth in the National HIV/AIDS Strategy.  The United States requires 
a multifaceted approach to ending HIV and HIV stigma that integrates its response into various 
services, questions institutions that disadvantage especially vulnerable populations, and never 
forgets those individuals in whose benefit its AIDS policy should be primarily directed.  AIDS 
activists have carried the relief effort to the point that it is now best served by integrating it into 
responses to other health and social issues.  Advocates for sexual minorities, on the other hand, 
have relied too heavily on integration, denying the realities of various movement constituents in 
order to serve the interests of movement elites.  The liberationist response to the early AIDS 
crisis evidenced the power of sexual minorities to broaden their agenda and force progress 
without apologizing for difference.  Now, using the machinery of the integrationist movement to 
advance a more liberationist agenda, sexual minorities have the power to propel society toward 
greater justice for all. 
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